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SECURITY OR CENSORSHIP? 
THE CRYPTOGRAPHY CONTROVERSY 
by 
Rodney H. Cooper 
Cryptography, the study of secret codes and cyphers,1 has long been the 
preserve of governments. In 1952 the United States Government created and 
designated the National Security Agency (NSA) to be the sole agency respons-
ible for developing and employing cryptographic techniques on the govern-
ment's behalf. It was also richly endowed with funds to encourage research in 
this field which was carried out, often with joint sponsorship of the National 
Science Foundation (NSF), at a limited number of universities.2 Until recently 
the knowledge gained from this research was distributed on a highly restricted 
"need to know" basis — the only keyword on research papers was MOST 
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SECRET. But in the 1970s cryptography began to emerge from the shadows. 
Books such as The Ultra Secret3 were published, universities with computer 
science faculties began to offer courses in cryptography and a scholarly journal 
was established.4 By the end of the decade issues of national security and 
academic freedom were once again on collision course. At the heart of the 
dispute is disagreement over the extent to which cryptographic research should 
remain classified.5 This article will discuss some of the issues involved. 
It is not generally recognized, even by the informed public, that cryptography 
represents a large, expensive and important part of the global equation of 
security between nations. Secure communications are essential for diplomacy, 
policy-making and military planning and operations. Governments need to be 
able to transmit and store vital information without leakage and encryption 
systems make such security possible. At the same time governments recognize 
implicitly the importance of having a capability to "break" the cyphers of their 
opponents, for this too enhances the security of the more skilful government. 
The tension between these apparently contradictory principles is accepted. Con-
sequently, cryptography is a study of cyclic efforts. As each technique or code 
system is invented, a penetration effort is mounted to by-pass or break it and 
governments must evaluate the cost of penetration (and preventing it) in terms 
not only of dollars, time and people, but also in relation to the value of the 
information being stored or transmitted. If the cost of penetration exceeds the 
value of the information gained then the encryption system may be said to be 
effective. Nonetheless, cryptographic research and operations are very expensive 
— the NSA's annual budget exceeds one billion dollars.6 
One fear, however, haunts security planners — the fear that the variables of 
the global equation may slip and destabilize the balance of security. With the 
growth of public and published research in cryptography, slippage in one vital 
part of the equation is already taking place. Such is the extent of non-govern-
ment research in the field that in 1979 Admiral Bobby Ray Inman, then Direc-
tor of NSA (and now Deputy Director of the CIA) broke with established 
precedent to warn publically that: "There is a very real and critical danger that 
unrestricted public discussion of cryptologie matters will seriously damage the 
ability of this government to carry out its mission of protecting national security 
information from hostile exploitation."7 Until Admiral Inman spoke out it was 
virtually unheard of for the NSA Director to make a public statement of any 
kind. Given the Admiral's reputation as an honest efficient bureaucrat who 
"thrived in the spotlight of Congressional oversight" of intelligence operations,8 
his concern should not be dismissed lightly. Where in the spectrum of low 
intensity conflict could the expansion of cryptographic research make a 
difference? 
Terrorism is one form of conflict which could benefit from the extension of 
cryptographic knowledge, since the effectiveness of terrorism depends very 
largely on accurate information about intended targets.9 Since information on 
the plans and activities of security forces and the leaders or other persons they 
are supposed to protect is usually stored or transmitted in code or cypher, a 
penetration capability would be useful to terrorists. In most western countries 
files, magnetic tapes, and computer storage facilities can be kept secure only to 
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an extent. Those authorized to have access are often unprotected, vulnerable to 
deception, coercion or compromise. Moreover, the universities are accessible 
and the journals are available. Mathematicians as good or better than those 
employed by government are leaving analysis, statistics and algebra (the areas 
essential as background for research in cryptography), taking their knowledge 
with them, studying coding systems, inventing and breaking them, meeting with 
their colleagues, exchanging ideas, and publishing. In addition there is profit 
motivated capital infusion from large computing and telecommunication 
corporations interested in the lucrative markets of data storage, transmission, 
and retrieval for industry, government, and the individual. Research into 
privacy technology is being seen as a definite commercial edge with a public 
currently obsessed with a fear of too much "Big Brother" government, indis-
criminate dissemination of public information, and the loss of the human right 
to privacy. 
Not all governments have access to giants like the NSA to guarantee the 
safety of the secrets they wish to store or send. These governments, unable to 
maintain a concerted effort of their own in cryptography and denied the 
knowledge of the large powers, have to service their security requirements with 
published algorithms, small groups of mathematicians without adequate train-
ing in the area, and a new industry that can claim expertise without adequate 
justification. In these smaller countries a terrorist group armed with this sudden 
surfeit of previously inaccessible information may probe and break the security 
codes, thereby gaining intelligence and hence, a degree of effectiveness they did 
not have previously. They may also employ these techniques within their own 
organization making it more difficult for the security forces to disrupt their 
activities. This is scarcely a fanciful threat. Both the Provisional IRA and the 
Italian Red Brigades have demonstrated considerable expertise in the field of 
communications intelligence and in France a group known as Direct Action has 
carried out concerted attacks on government computer centres.10 
Terrorism is merely one form of conflict which can be affected by the spread 
of cryptographic knowledge. Espionage is another, but it is beyond the scope of 
this essay. Clearly there are implications for civil liberties that lie well beyond 
the field of conflict studies." But the clock cannot be turned back on crypto-
graphic research and it is to be hoped that western nations can devise a formula 
which balances the needs of national security, academic freedom and the 
individual right to privacy. 
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INFRASTRUCTURES OF TERRORIST 
ORGANIZATIONS1 
by 
J.K. Zawodny 
The purpose of this article is to answer three questions: first, what is the main 
characteristic of terrorist organizations that affects their infrastructure? Second, 
what does the infrastructure look like? Third, how does this infrastructure affect 
the behavior of terrorists? The analytical level of concern here is that of group 
dynamics.2 "Infrastructure," for the purpose of the article, means an internal 
organization structure, including formal and informal networks within that 
structure. It is this writer's thesis that this structure affects the behaviour and 
activities of terrorists. 
The data comes from nonclassified, open sources (in five languages), dealing 
with active terrorist movements in the USA and abroad. Since it is quite 
impossible, for security reasons, to acquire reliable information from first hand 
interviews with terrorists, this article by necessity relies on scattered data that in 
many instances defies verification. Nonetheless, in the view of this writer, who 
had five years of combat service as an urban guerrilla during World War II, the 
data provides sufficient basis for conclusions to be drawn from uniformly 
present characteristics across several cultures. 
Main Organizational Characteristics Affecting Infrastructure 
The principal characteristic is the relatively small size of the organizations. It 
might be useful for comparative purposes to realize that the European under-
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